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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4454 
___________ 
 
DEBORAH ANN NARDELLA, 
                            Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS;  
STEVEN JORDON; GARY GIOIOSO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-05629) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 23, 2015 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 26, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Deborah Ann Nardella appeals from the orders of the District Court entering 
summary judgment in favor of her former employer Philadelphia Gas Works (“PGW”)  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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and its denial of her motion for reconsideration of that ruling.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 Nardella worked for PGW as a Secretarial Assistant from 2003 until PGW 
terminated her employment in 2008.  She reported to PGW’s Director of Labor during 
that time.  Nardella (who is Caucasian) claims that PGW began discriminating against her 
on the basis of her race and gender when Steven Jordon (who is African-American) 
became the Director in February of 2006.  Jordon’s predecessor gave Nardella 
satisfactory reviews, but Jordon gave her unsatisfactory reviews that, according to PGW, 
led it to place her on two performance improvement plans (“PIP”) and then ultimately 
terminate her for poor performance. 
 After obtaining a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, Nardella filed suit pro se and later an amended complaint against PGW 
asserting five claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one claim for 
“ridicule/harassment/psychological harassment,” and one claim under the Equal Pay Act 
of 1963.1  On PGW’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the District Court dismissed the 
last two of these claims but permitted Nardella’s Title VII claims to proceed.  Following 
discovery, the District Court granted PGW’s motion for summary judgment and later  
                                              
1 Nardella named Jordon and another PGW employee as defendants along with PGW but, 
by order entered July 12, 2010, the District Court properly dismissed her Title VII claims 
against the individual defendants because Title VII provides a cause of action only 
against employers.  See Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 
1077-78 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
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denied Nardella’s motion for reconsideration.  Nardella appeals.2 
II. 
 We will affirm the entry of summary judgment on Nardella’s Title VII claims 
primarily for the reasons explained by the District Court.  Nardella claims that PGW: (1) 
discriminated against her on the basis of her race and gender by, inter alia, placing her on 
PIPs, denying her raises and a promotion, and ultimately terminating her; (2) terminated 
her in retaliation for filing an internal complaint regarding alleged discrimination; and (3) 
subjected her to a hostile working environment, largely in the form of “outbursts” by 
Jordon, on the basis of her race and gender as well.   
 Nardella’s claims of discrimination are governed by the familiar burden-shifting 
framework that required her to make out a prima facie case by, inter alia, raising an 
inference that PGW’s adverse employment actions were motivated by discriminatory 
                                              
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Nardella states in her opening brief that 
she challenges the District Court’s disposition of “each and every claim” in her amended 
complaint, but her opening brief raises arguments regarding only the District Court’s 
entry of summary judgment on her Title VII claims and its denial of reconsideration.  To 
the extent that her briefs can be read to raise proper challenges to the District Court’s 
dismissal of her remaining claims, we will affirm for the reasons stated by the District 
Court.  We exercise plenary review over the entry of summary judgment and will affirm 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “‘there is no 
genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.’”  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  We review the denial of reconsideration for abuse of 
discretion but review the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo.  See Addie v. Kjaer, 
737 F.3d 854, 867 (3d Cir. 2013). 
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intent.  See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).3  The same framework 
governs Nardella’s retaliation claim and requires her to make out a prima facie case by 
showing, inter alia, a causal connection between her allegedly protected activities and 
PGW’s adverse employment actions.  See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193.  Nardella’s hostile 
environment claim also requires a showing of some causal connection between her 
membership in a protected class and her alleged mistreatment.  See Mandel v. M & Q 
Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (gender); Caver v. City of Trenton, 
420 F.3d 243, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2005) (race). 
 The District Court properly determined that Nardella presented no evidence 
raising a reasonable inference that any of PGW’s alleged conduct was motivated by her 
race, gender, or engagement in protected activities, and her arguments to the contrary are 
not supported by the record.  Nardella argues that the District Court “overlooked” 
evidence purportedly raising an inference of discrimination and retaliation, but the 
District Court thoroughly reviewed the record and, having done so ourselves, we agree 
with the District Court that Nardella’s arguments regarding discrimination and retaliation 
constitute “nothing more than speculation and accusation.”  (ECF No. 49 at 16.)4 
                                              
3 If the plaintiff raises an inference of discrimination, the burden of production “shifts to 
the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action.”  Makky, 541 F.3d at 214.  “If the defendant does so, the inference 
of discrimination drops and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant’s proffered reason is merely pretext for intentional discrimination.”  Id. 
 
4 Nardella relies primarily on twelve items of evidence that she claims the District Court 
overlooked or that otherwise support her claims.  (Appellant’s Br. at 9-12.)  Nardella 
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 In particular, Nardella adduced no evidence that her race or gender played any role 
in her alleged mistreatment by Jordon, placement on PIPs, denial of raises and a 
promotion, or eventual termination.  The closest she came was by providing evidence that 
she applied for two higher-paying, non-secretarial positions within PGW that PGW 
awarded to men without considering her.  Nardella, however, presented no evidence that 
she was qualified for those positions.  See Makky, 541 F.3d at 214.  She also concedes 
that she was not eligible to interview for them because she had been placed on a second 
PIP.  (Appellant’s Br. at 5.) 
 Nardella argues that such placement, and the unsatisfactory reviews that 
precipitated it, raise an inference of discrimination because she received satisfactory 
reviews under the former Director.  The mere fact that she received different reviews for 
different time periods from different Directors does not raise an inference of 
discrimination, however, particularly when PGW initially replaced her with another 
                                                                                                                                                  
filed this evidence with the District Court in hard copy along with ECF No. 46, and we 
have requested and reviewed the original record.  Some of this evidence, as Nardella 
concedes with respect to PGW’s response to her Interrogatory 15 (id. at 11), was not 
submitted to the District Court and does not appear of record.  Other evidence does not 
support the propositions for which Nardella cites it.  For example, Nardella cites her 
Exhibit 16 for the proposition that she was the only white secretary fired on her floor 
(which undermines her claim of racial discrimination) (id.), but that exhibit is her own 
termination letter and says nothing about other employees.  Nardella also asserts that 
Jordon and another PGW employee gave “conflicting testimony . . . concerning her 
termination” at their depositions (id. at 12), but neither the transcripts she cites (Exhs. 17-
19) nor any other transcript she submitted (Exhs. 12, 13, 15, 20-24) reveals any such 
conflicting testimony and the PGW employees instead testified consistently that PGW 
terminated her for poor performance.  None of Nardella’s other evidence raises an 
inference of discrimination or retaliation as discussed herein. 
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Caucasian woman under the new Director.  Nardella correctly argues that her 
replacement by another person within the same protected classes does not preclude her 
claim as a matter of law, see Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2003), but it is one factor among many that the District Court appropriately considered in 
determining that the totality of the circumstances does not raise an inference of 
discrimination or retaliation. 
 Finally, the District Court properly concluded that, even if Nardella had raised 
such an inference, she failed to rebut PGW’s proffered legitimate reason for placing her 
on PIPs and then terminating her—i.e., her documented poor performance under Jordon.  
Nardella argues that there were no problems with her performance but, even if that were 
true, a plaintiff seeking to rebut a proffered legitimate reason “cannot simply show that 
the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken to prove pretext” but rather “must 
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherences, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a 
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence[.]”  Ross v. 
Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 194 n.13 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).  Neither the 
fact that Nardella received better reviews from the former Director nor any of her other 
evidence rises to that level.   
 Having concluded that the District Court did not err in entering summary 
judgment on Nardella’s Title VII claims, we further conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in declining to reconsider that ruling. 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
